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Most of the writers of monographs on the subject of priori-
ties and many of the judges appear to think that there is some-
thing essentially commendable in giving one claimant priority
over others. This is a peculiar psychological phenomenon.
Auston Wakeman Scott
I. THE FACTS
General Coffee Corporation ("General Coffee") is a Florida
corporation that purchases, processes, and sells coffee. In March of
1982, General Coffee expanded its business by purchasing the as-
sets of the Chase & Sanborn Company from Standard Brands, Inc.
The purchased assets included a fully equipped processing plant in
New Orleans, Louisiana, a substantial inventory of coffee, and all
of the licenses and trademarks of Chase & Sanborn. The contract
required payment of three million dollars cash, a note for four and
* The author of this casenote was employed as a summer associate by the law offices of
Alan J. Kluger, special litigation counsel for General Coffee Corp. The clerkship ended prior
to the writing of this casenote.
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three-quarters million dollars, and a cash amount equivalent to the
fair market value of Standard Brands's inventory of coffee one day
prior to the closing, an amount subsequently determined to be
$6,488,011.00.1
General Coffee obtained the funds to purchase the inventory
by the following fraudulent scheme. Camilio Bautista, simulta-
neously an officer of City National Bank and Dominio Invest-
ments, Ltd., a company which controlled General Coffee, advised
City National Bank to purchase a Eurodollar certificate of deposit
in the amount of eight million dollars from Banco Exterior, S.A.
(Panama). Bautista then, without authorization, but acting with
apparent authority as an officer of City National Bank, pledged the
certificate of deposit to Banco Exterior as collateral for an eight
million dollar loan for Dominio Investments. Dominio Investments
transferred the funds to General Coffee through an intricate series
of bank transactions. General Coffee used the eight million dollars
to purchase Chase & Sanborn's coffee inventory at the time of the
takeover. Dominio subsequently defaulted on the loan payments
causing Banco Exterior to seize City National Bank's certificate of
deposit.2
In May of 1983, before City National Bank filed suit, General
Coffee petitioned for reorganization and protection from its credi-
tors under chapter eleven of the Bankruptcy Code.3 On January
13, 1984, City National Bank of Miami and City National Bank
Corporation (collectively referred to as "City National Bank") ini-
tiated proceedings against General Coffee in both the United
States Bankruptcy Court' and the Dade County Circuit Court,"
They sought imposition of a constructive trust over the assets ob-
tained by General Coffee in the purchase of Chase & Sanborn.
They filed the petitions on January 13, 1984. On February 3, 1984,
the presiding judges in the bankruptcy proceeding yielded to the
jurisdiction of the circuit court and dismissed City National Bank's
1. City Nat'l Bank of Miami v. General Coffee Corp. (In re General Coffee Corp.), 41
Bankr. 781, 782-83 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
2. Id. City National Bank sued Banco Exterior in a separate proceeding alleging wrong-
ful conversion of the certificate of deposit. City Nat'l Bank of Miami v. Banco Exterior de
Espana, S.A., No. 83-20817 CA-21 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. 1983).
3. In re General Coffee Corp., Debtor (S.D. Fla. 1984) (Case No. 84-00889).
4. City Nat'l Bank of Miami v. General Coffee Corp. (In re General Coffee Corp.), BKC
Adv. No. 84-0028-BKC-TCB-A (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
5. City Nat'l Bank of Miami v. General Coffee Corp., No. 84-05304 CA-29 (Fla. 11th
Cir. Ct. 1984).
6. The Honorable Thomas C. Britton presided.
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complaint without prejudice. He also stayed the General Coffee re-
organization proceedings pending determination of the issues in
the circuit court. On July 30, 1984, however, the judge vacated his
Order of Dismissal and scheduled a hearing on the adversary pro-
ceedings. 7 Shawmut Boston International Banking Corporation, a
major creditor of General Coffee, intervened and supported the po-
sition of General Coffee.
II. BRIEF DISCUSSION
City National Bank sought to obtain the assets which General
Coffee aquired from its purchase of Chase & Sanborn. It relied on
a theory of constructive trust. In Florida, a constructive trust
arises only when a court of competent jurisdiction declares the
trust to exist.' Under the United States Bankruptcy Code, the
rights of the trustee in bankruptcy (the rights of a perfect hypo-
thetical lienholder) arise upon commencement of the bankruptcy
proceeding.' Therefore, the rights of the Trustee attach prior to
the time when creation of a trust becomes possible. Accordingly,
the court held: General Coffee's interest as the trustee in bank-
ruptcy was superior to City National Bank's interest as the benefi-
ciary of a constructive trust. City National Bank of Miami v. Gen-
eral Coffee Corporation (In re General Coffee Corp.), 41 Bankr.
781 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984). If affirmed on appeal, this decision
will have far reaching effects on the practice of bankruptcy law in
the state of Florida. The constructive trust remedy will no longer
be available to creditors as an aid in regaining fraudently taken
assets, as long as the debtor files for the protection of a bankruptcy
court prior to the time the creditor files suit.
7. Judge Britton's decision to accept jurisdiction over the matter may have been influ-
enced by the fact that proceedings in the Eleventh Circuit Court in and for Dade County
would take several months or longer. Since the subject matter of the controversy included
the assets of General Coffee, any possible reorganization plan had to be stayed pending the
outcome of the adversary proceeding. If the reorganization plan had been instituted prior to
the decision in the adversary proceeding, and City National Bank had subsequently pre-
vailed, the assets that City National Bank would have been entitled to may have been al-
ready distributed to creditors or otherwise utilized in the corporate reorganization.
8. See Palmland Villas I Condominium Assoc. v. Taylor, 390 So. 2d 123, 124-25 (Fla.
4th DCA 1980); see also infra text accompanying notes 20-22 (describing Florida construc-
tive trust case law).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1978) (emphasis added).
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Constructive Trust Defined
A constructive trust is not a trust at all, but a tool of equity.
To promote an equitable result, the courts apply a legal fiction
when one unjustly holds the property of another. The court fic-
titously deems the property to be held in trust. The court deems
the party unjustly holding the property to be the trustee, and the
party to whom the property justly belongs to be the beneficiary.10
It is helpful to contrast constructive trusts with express and
resulting trusts. An express trust is a fiduciary relationship that
arises because the parties manifest an intent to create a trust. The
trustee owes equitable duties to the beneficiary of the trust and
handles the trust property on behalf of the beneficiary." A result-
ing trust arises by operation of law when the parties intend to cre-
ate an express trust but fail, due to some technicality.12 Thus, in
both express and resulting trusts, the parties must intend to create
a trust relationship.
A constructive trust, on the other hand, is not based upon the
intention of the parties. It is imposed to prevent one person from
being unjustly enriched at the expense of another." The construc-
tive trust, unlike the express trust or resulting trust, is a remedial
10. See G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 471 (2d ed. 1978).
In Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., Judge Cardozo explained:
A constructive trust is the formula through which the conscience of equity finds
expression. When property has been acquired in such circumstances that the
holder of the legal title may not in good conscience retain the beneficial interest,
equity converts him into a trustee ....
A court of equity in declaring a constructive trust is bound by no unyield-
ing formula. The equity of the transaction must shape the measure of relief.
225 N.Y. 380, 386, 389, 122 N.E. 378, 380-381 (1919). See also Hallam v. Gladman, 132 So.
2d 198 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961) (Florida court adopting similar definition). See generally 1
PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 1.3 (1978) (history of constructive trusts).
11. 5 A. Scor, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 462.1 (3d ed. 1967).
12. 4 A. ScoTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 404.1 (2d ed. 1956).
In Grapes v. Mitchell, the Supreme Court of Florida explained:
[A] resulting trust is simply a status that automatically arises by operation of
law out of certain circumstances. In the creation of a resulting trust, it is essen-
tial that the parties actually intend to create the trust relationship but failed to
execute documents or establish adequate evidence of the intent. In a resulting
trust, a vital element is the intention which will be presumed from the facts
... A resulting trust is one which exists because of inferred or presumed in-
tent of a property owner, as distinguished from a trust based on intent which is
directly and clearly expressed.
159 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 1963).
13. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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device and not a substantive institution.14
City National Bank did not allege the existence of a resulting
or express trust in the bankruptcy court; they could not have sup-
ported such an allegation because the parties never intended to
create a trust relationship. They relied instead on a theory of con-
structive trust. 6 The outcome of General Coffee on appeal will de-
pend on the appellate court's determination of when a constructive
trust is created.
B. Constructive Trust - Two Theories of Creation
There are two views regarding when a constructive trust comes
into existence.' 6 In the majority of states, a constructive trust
arises when a fraudulent transaction gives rise to the necessity of
the imposition of a constructive trust.17 In other states, a construc-
tive trust arises only after the beneficiary asks a court of compe-
14. See Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919 Equity, 33 HARv. L. REV. 420, 421
(1920). See generally, Costigan, The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting and
Constructive, 27 HARv. L. REv. 437 (1914) (detailed development of the various trusts, their
creation and distinctions).
In explaining the differences among express, resulting, and constructive trusts, the Su-
preme Court of Florida stated:
As distinguished from an express trust, there are two types of so-called implied
trusts. One is known'as a "resulting trust". The other is known as a "construc-
tive trust". Although some confusion exists as to the distinction between the
two, it appears to us that our own decisions make the differences clear and dis-
pose of the confusing elements. A resulting trust is simply a status that automa-
tically arises by operation of law out of certain circumstances. A constructive
trust is a remedy which equity applies in order to do justice. In the creation of a
resulting trust it is essential that the parties actually intend to create the trust
relationship but fail to execute documents or establish adequate evidence of the
intent ....
By contrast, a constructive trust is a relationship adjudicated to exist by a
court of equity based on particular factual situations created by one or the other
of the parties. The element of intent or agreement either dral or written to cre-
ate the trust relationship is totally lacking. The trust is "constructed" by equity
to prevent an unjust enrichment of one person at the expense of another as the
result of fraud, undue influence, abuse of confidence or mistake in the transac-
tion that originates the problem.
Wadlington v. Edwards, 92 So. 2d 629, 631 (Fla. 1957).
15. General Coffee Corp., 41 Bankr. at 782.
16. See BOGERT, supra note 10, at § 472.
17. See, e.g., Shearer v. Barnes, where the court stated:
The trust, in such a case, is not created by the court, but is merely declared by
the court to have arisen when a certain state of facts is shown. The court may or
may not enforce the trust, according to the equities of the parties when its aid is
sought; but the trust'itself is a creature of equity, born of and contemporane-
ously with the wrongful diversion of the beneficiaries' funds. (Emphasis added).
118 Minn. 179, 188, 136 N.W. 861, 864 (1912).
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tent jurisdiction to impose the trust, and the court declares one to
exist.18 The theory underlying the latter viewpoint is that a con-
structive trust is not a trust at all, but merely a remedy which a
court may utilize when necessary to provide an equitable result.1 9
The State of Florida adheres to the minority position. In
Palmland Villas I Condominium Association v. Taylor,2 0 a seller
fraudulently conveyed real property to a development corporation
to be used for recreational purposes. The conveyance was duly re-
corded. Subsequently, claimants recorded a tax lien and three
judgments against the property. The liens were enforceable only if
they arose prior to creation of the constructive trust. The Florida
Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the liens attached to the
real property prior to the creation of the constructive trust because
the constructive trust did not arise until the court declared it to
exist, approximately three years later.2 1 The beneficiaries of the
constructive trust took the position that the tax and judgment
liens never attached because the property was a trust asset from
the time of the earlier (fraudulent) conveyance. The court stated:
The result in this case turns upon the answer to the ques-
tion, when does a constructive trust come into existence. We de-
termine that a constructive trust comes into existence on the
date of the order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdic-
tion declaring that a series of events has given rise to a construc-
tive trust...
... Therefore there was no trust in existence when the liens at-
18. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Bradford-White Corp. (In re Tinnell Traffic Serv.), 41
Bankr. 1018, 1021 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (bankruptcy court applying Tennessee state
law determined that "Islince constructive trusts are judge-created equitable remedies, the
trust does not come into existence until imposed by a court of equity."); see also Stoehr v.
Miller, 296 F. 414, 427 (2d Cir. 1923).
19. See In re Tinnell Traffic Services, 41 Bankr. at 1021; see also International Refugee
Org. v. Maryland Drydock Co., where the Fourth Circuit stated:
A constructive trust is not a title to or lien upon property but a mere remedy to
which equity resorts in granting relief against fraud; and it does not exist so as
to affect the property held by a wrongdoer until it is declared by a court of
equity as a means of affording relief.
179 F.2d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 1950).
Certain courts that support this "remedy versus trust" distinction have found it signifi-
cant that constructive trusts are dealt with in the Restatement of Restitution rather than
the Restatement of Trusts. See, e.g., Papazian v. American Steel & Wire Co., 155 F. Supp.
111, 119 (N.D. Ohio 1957).
20. 390 So. 2d 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). The Supreme Court of Florida has never ruled
on this issue.
21. Id. at 124.
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tached. Imposition of a constructive trust by the order of Janu-
ary 5, 1979, [declaring the real property to be held in construc-
tive trust] could have no effect on the validity or priority of
those liens.
2 2
As stated above, the determination of when a constructive trust
arises is crucial to the outcome of the General Coffee litigation.
C. The Strong Arm Clause
When a lender contemplates extending credit, the lender
searches the state records to discover whether any liens exist upon
the assets of the potential loan recipient because the lender's inter-
est is subordinate to any pre-existing interests.28 A lender's great-
est fear is that of a "secret lien." Where a secret lien exists, a
lender may extend credit to a borrower feeling assured that the
loan is supported by adequate collateral but may discover, upon
default, that there are other creditors with previous, unrecorded
claims that have priority to the debtor's assets. One potential con-
sequence of giving priority to previous, unrecorded liens would be
to discourage the extension of credit.
Recognizing the potential danger to American business, Con-
22. Id. at 124-25. The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal cited Palmland Villas I as
precedent in Cohen v. Hardman, 416 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982). In Cohen, James
Savage was the principal on two bail bonds posted by Dependable Insurance Co. through its
surety agent, Leroy Hardman, in the amount of $5,250.00. Savage failed to appear in court
and the bonds were discharged. Armond Savoie, allegedly involved with Savage, indemnified
Hardman.
Approximately six months later, Savage was rearrested. He hired Meredith Cohen as
his attorney. Pursuant to a plea bargain, Savage pled nolo contendere. One of the conditions
of the bargain was that the state remit the forfeited bonds. Savage, alleging that he reim-
bursed Hardman, sought remission of the forfeited bonds pursuant to the negotiated plea.
The court released the funds to Savage, through his attorney, Cohen. Cohen retained
$2,000.00 for attorney fees, paid $100.00 in court costs, and transferred the remaining
$3,150.00 to Savage. Pursuant to the negotiated plea, Savage moved out of state and as-
sumed a new identity. Id. at 499.
Subsequently, Hardman learned of the remission of the bonds, and alleging that Savage
never reimbursed him, filed a motion to set aside the remission. The court added Savoie as a
necessary party. The trial court set aside the remission, and ordered Cohen to place the
funds with the court pending determination of who was entitled to them. Id. at 499-500.
The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal, in reversing the order of the trial court, held
that it was error for the trial court to order Cohen to place his own funds with the court (the
remitted funds had already been discharged to Savage) prior to a determination of liability.
The court stated, "This premature action is similar to ordering the imposition of a construc-
tive trust on a person's assets before there has been a determination that the trust should be
imposed." Id. at 500. Thus, the holding of Cohen v. Hardman does not directly support
Palmland, but rather implies Palmland to be the correct Florida law.
23. U.C.C. § 9-301 (1978).
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gress enacted what is commonly known as the "strong arm clause."
The clause originally made its appearance in 1910 as an amend-
ment to section 47a(2) of the then existing Bankruptcy Act.2' The
strong arm clause is currently found in section 544(a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.25 It protects the trustee in bankruptcy from secret
liens by endowing him with the status of a perfected lienholder
from the date of the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding.
The legislative history of section 544 explains:
[The strong arm clause] gives the trustee the rights of a creditor
on a simple contract with a judicial lien on the property of the
debtor as of the date of the petition; of a creditor with a writ of
execution against the property of the debtor unsatisfied as of the
date of the petition; and a bona fide purchaser of the real prop-
erty of the debtor as of the date of the petition.2
Courts deem previously unrecorded (and unperfected) interests to
arise subsequent to the interests of the trustee in bankruptcy,2 7 en-
abling the trustee to defeat the claims of secret lienholders. The
size of the debtor's estate which is to be distributed among the
debtor's creditors is thus increased.2 8
24. 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 70.47 (14th ed. 1978) (history of the strong arm
clause).
25. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1978). Section 544(a) provides:
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard
to any knowlege of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or
may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by
the debtor that is voidable by-
1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with
respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a cred-
itor on a simple contract could have obtained a judicial lien, whether
or not such a creditor exists;
2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and with re-
spect to such credit, an execution against the debtor that is returned
unsatisfied at such time, whether or not such a creditor exists; and
3) a bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor,
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected,
that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser at the time of the
commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists.
Id.
26. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 370 (1977).
27. See U.C.C. § 9-301 (1978).
28. 4 COLLIER ON .BANKRUPTCY § 544.01 (15th ed. 1984). See In re Quality Holstein
Leasing, where the court explains that the trustee's strong arm powers:
serve essentially to marshal all of the debtor's assets, including some that the
debtor itself could not recover, in order to enhance the resources available to the
pool of creditors. Exercise of the powers allows the estate to avoid, among other
[Vol. 39:757
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D. Competing Property Interests
Bankruptcy cases usually involve many parties competing for
limited assets of the debtor. In General Coffee, City National Bank
attempted to assert its rights via a constructive trust, to aquire as-
sets of the debtor as compensation for the funds that the debtor
wrongfully acquired. Simultaneously, the debtor-trustee opposed
imposition of the trust because it sought to protect the interests of
its general creditors. By invalidating the claims of City National
Bank, the debtor-trustee could increase the size of the estate to be
shared among the general creditors.19
Bankruptcy law requires a bankruptcy court to apply state law
to resolve the rights of competing interests in property.30 For ex-
ample, in In re Shepherd,3 ' the bankruptcy court explained that
the court should apply the choice of law rule of the forum state to
determine the rights of competing interests in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. The court determinined that Florida law required "a court
to apply the law of the state having the most significant relation-
ship to the occurrence and to the parties with respect to the is-
sue." '32 The court cited Bishop v. Florida Speciality Paint Com-
pany"3 for authority. In Bishop, the Supreme Court of Florida
identified the following factors as the contacts to be considered
when choosing the applicable law: a) the place where the injury
occurred; b) the place where the conduct causing the injury oc-
curred; c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion, and place of business of the parties; and d) the place where
the relationship between the parties, if any, was centered.3 4 The
General Coffee court presumably applied the above factors in de-
termining that Florida law controlled.
35
interests, secret or otherwise unperfected liens on property that the debtor ap-
pears to own on the petition date.
752 F.2d 1009, 1014 (5th Cir. 1985).
An important facet of the Bankruptcy Code applicable to the instant case deems the
trustee to be without knowledge of any wrongful actions of the debtor, regardless of the
trustee's actual knowledge. COLLIER, supra note 28, at § 544.01. Therefore, General Coffee,
as the debtor in possession (trustee), is deemed without knowledge of any fraudulent
occurrence.
29. Id.
30. See COLLIER, supra note 28, at § 544.02.
31. Central Trust Co. v. Shepard (In re Shepard), 29 Bankr. 928 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1983).
32. Id. at 931.
33. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
34. Id. at 1001. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1969).
35. General Coffee Corp., 41 Bankr. 781, 783. If Louisana law had controlled, City Na-
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The priority of a judicial lien creditor (for example, a trustee
in bankruptcy versus the beneficiary of a constructive trust) must
be determined by state law since it involves competing interests in
property.36 If the state holds that a constructive trust does not
arise until entry of an order declaring the trust to exist, as in Flor-
ida, then the trustee in bankruptcy can use the strong arm clause
of the Bankruptcy Code to defeat the interests of the constructive
trust beneficiary, even though the beneficiary may have a valid
claim of fraud against the debtor.
3
1
In Lancaster v. Key,"s the beneficiary of a resulting trust took
priority over the trustee under section 544(a), since under the ap-
plicable state law, a resulting trust arose at the time of the actions
creating the trust, and not at the time of judgment. In Lancaster,
the plaintiffs purchased real property from the debtor in bank-
ruptcy for sixty seven thousand dollars. The transaction was com-
pleted on August 17, 1979. The plaintiffs did not record the deed
until August 29, 1980, approximately one year later. In the interim,
the debtor filed a Chapter Seven petition in bankruptcy. Since
under Tennessee state law unregistered deeds are voidas to preex-
isting creditors, the bankruptcy court held that the trustee in
bankruptcy, cloaked with his section 544 power, had superior
rights to the property. 9 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee reversed.40
In reversing, the court pointed out that a resulting trust arises
in Tennessee at the time of the actions creating the trust, not at
the time of judgment. Since the actions creating the trust
(purchase of the property) occurred prior to the interests of the
lien creditor (which arose when the debtor filed for bankruptcy)
the plaintiff's rights were superior to the rights of the trustee in
bankruptcy.
4 1
General Coffee required a different resolution. City National
tional Bank would have had no chance of success on the merits. The Louisiana Civil Code
prohibits the imposition of a constructive trust or equitable lien on any property. Mansfield
Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317, 319 (5th Cir. 1959).
36. In re Tinnell Traffic Services, Inc., 41 Bankr. 1018. Accord In re Quality Holstein
Leasing, 752 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1985); In re American International Airways, Inc., 44
Bankr. 143 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
37. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
38. 24 Bankr. 897 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982).
39. Id. at 899. See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-26-103 (1982) (unregistered instrument
void as to creditors and bona fide purchasers).
40. 24 Bankr. at 899.
41. Id. Accord In re American Int'l Airways, Inc., 44 Bankr. 143 (beneficiary of con-
structive trust defeated interests of trustee in bankruptcy applying New Jersey state law).
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Bank claimed General Coffee's property under a theory of con-
structive trust, not resulting trust. City National Bank could not
become the beneficiary of a constructive trust until a Florida court
declared it to be the beneficiary. Meanwhile, General Coffee ac-
quired the rights and powers of a perfect hypothetical judicial lien
creditor on the date it filed its petition with the bankruptcy court.
Thus, General Coffee's rights necessarily arose prior to those of
City National Bank. Since General Coffee's rights were prior, they
were held to be superior to the rights of City National Bank. 2
42. General Coffee maintained an alternate position for use in the event the trial court
did not accept the constructive trust/strong arm clause theory. A constructive trust may
only attach to specific property currently in the hands of the defendant. See Fore Way
Express, Inc. v. Mid-American Lines, Inc. (In re Mid-American Lines, Inc.), 24 Bankr. 52,
53 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982).
The Restatement of Restitution provides: "[W]here a person wrongfully disposes of the
property of another but the property cannot be traced into any product, the other has
merely a personal claim against the wrongdoer and cannot enforce a constructive trust or
lien upon any part of the wrongdoer's property." RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 215(1)
(1936).
Comment A to the Restatement section states:
Where a person wrongfully disposes of the property of another, the other is not
entitled to priority over the general creditors of the wrongdoer merely because of
the character of the wrong done to him. Thus, if a trustee sells trust property
and dissipates the proceeds, the beneficiary of the trust is not entitled to priority
over other claimants of the trustee (see Restatement of Trusts, § 202). The
claimant must prove not only that the wrongdoer once had property legally or
equitably belonging to him, but that he still holds the property or property
which is in whole or in part its product. (Emphasis added).
Id.
Comment a.
It is clear that this strict tracing requirement is the law in Florida. See Schifter v. First
Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc. (In re First Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc.), 36 Bankr. 508, 512 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1983) ("the rule repeatedly expressed in the Florida cases is that trust funds must
be strictly traceable to particular property which is capable of clear identification."). The
facts in the instant case showed that the purchase price of Chase & Sanborn consisted of
three million dollars cash, a note in the amount of four and three quarters million dollars,
and the value of certain inventory determined on the day before closing. The evidence at
trial showed the value of the inventory to be $6,488,011. Additionally, the evidence at trial
demonstrated that the funds went directly to purchase the inventory, that the inventory was
later dissipated, and that the proceeds therefrom were comingled with other funds. 41
Bankr. at 782.
It was the defendant's position that since these funds no longer existed as an identifi-
able entity, there was no res over which a constructive trust could attach. See The Trial
Memorandum for General Coffee at 10, General Coffee Corp. 41 Bankr. 781. City National
Bank, on the other hand, asserted that since the funds were directly traceable to the
purchase of Chase & Sanborn, they were entitled to a constructive trust over the assets of
Chase & Sanborn. Trial Brief for Plaintiff at 7-8, General Coffee Corp., 41 Bankr. 781. The
question was, how far did the tracing requirement go? City National Bank argued that since
they traced the funds to the contract for the purchase of Chase & Sanborn, they were enti-
tled to a constructive trust over all of the assets of that company. Id. General Coffee, con-
19851
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IV. INTERPLAY BETWEEN §§ 544 AND 541
City National Bank took the position that section 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code 43 "removes" the subject matter of the instant
versely, asserted that City National Bank could not conveniently stop tracing at will, but
had to continue to trace as far as possible. Trial Memorandum for General Coffee at 10,
General Coffee Corp., 41 Bankr. 781. The funds were directly traceable to inventory which
had since been dissipated. Accordingly, General Coffee insisted, there was no trust res over
which a constructive trust could attach.
Judge Britton, without discussing the issues involved, stated in one sentence, "I find
that the trust res in the amount of $6,488,011.00 has been traced by the plaintiffs in its
original or substituted form to assets presently within the control of the debtor." General
Coffee Corp., 41 Bankr. at 783. General Coffee is likely to allege that Judge Britton erred in
this finding when it argues the appeal.
43. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (1982). Section 541 reads:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title
creates an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wher-
ever located:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section,
all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community
property as of the commencement of the case that is-
(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and control of
the debtor; or
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for
both an allowable claim against the debtor and an allowable
claim against the debtor's spouse, to the extent that such in-
terest is so liable.
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section
543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title.
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the benefit of or ordered
transferred to the estate under section 510(c) or 551 of this title.
(5) An interest in property that would have been property of the es-
tate if such interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of
the filing of the petition, and that the debtor acquires or becomes
entitled to acquire within 180 days after such date-
(A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance;
(B) as a result of a property settlement agreement with the
debtor's spouse, or of an interlocutory or final divorce decree;
or
(C) as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death
benefit plan.
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, and profits of or from prop-
erty of the estate, except such as are earnings from services per-
formed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case.
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the com-
mencement of the case.
(b) Property of the estate does not include any power that the debtor may only
exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other than the debtor.
(c)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an interest of the
debtor in property becomes property of the state under subsection (a)(1), (a)(2),
or (a)(5) of this section notwithstanding any provision-
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controversy from the "property of the estate.""' Because the prop-
erty is not part of the estate, the powers of the trustee in bank-
ruptcy under the strong arm clause are to no avail; those powers
apply only to "property of the debtor,""' and not to property ex-
cluded from the debtor's estate by the operation of section 541.
The crux of this argument is that property wrongfully obtained is
not part of the estate no matter when the constructive trust over
the property arises.
City National Bank may find support for its argument in the
decision of In re Fieldcrest Homes, Inc.'6 In Fieldcrest, according
to the complaint, Independence Land Title Company of Illinois
(Independence), a corporation related to Fieldcrest Homes, Inc.
(A) that restricts or conditions transfer of such interest by the
debtor; or
(B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition
of the debtor, on the commencement of a case under this title,
or on the appointment of or the taking possession by a trustee
in a case under this title or a custodian, and that effects or
gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termina-
tion of the debtor's interest in property.
(2) A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor
in a trust that is enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law is
enforceable in a case under this title.
(d) Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case,
only legal title and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real
property, or an interest in such a mortgage, sold by the debtor but as to which
the debtor retains legal title to service or supervise the servicing of such mort-
gage or interest, becomes property of the estate under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion only to the extent of the debtor's legal title to such property, but not to the
extent of any equitable interest in such property that the debtor does not hold.
(e) The estate shall have the benefit of any defense available to the debtor as
against an entity other than the estate, including statutes of limitation, statutes
of frauds, usury, and other personal defenses. A waiver of any such defense by
the debtor after the commencement of the case does not bind the estate.
44. Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code defines "property of the estate." The legisla-
tive history of that section makes it clear that in defining "property of the estate," Congress
did not intend "to expand the debtor's rights against others more than they exist[ed] at the
commencement of the case." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68 (1977) re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5868; S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 82-83 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 5787, 6323.
In other words, an interest in property that is limited in the hands of the debtor is
equally limited in the hands of the estate's trustee in bankruptcy. Based on these state-
ments of the purpose of section 541, City National Bank argues that if the debtor, General
Coffee, was not entitled to retain the assets prior to bankruptcy because it had obtained
them fraudulently, then the trustee in bankruptcy similarly may not retain the assets irre-
spective of when a constructive trust over the assets arises. The Trial Brief for Plaintiff,
General Coffee Corp., 41 Bankr. 781.
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a).
46. 18 Bankr. 678 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982).
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(Fieldcrest), collected escrow money from home buyers but failed
to use the money to pay off construction mortgagees as the parties
had agreed. U.S. Life, underwriter of the title insurance policies,
had to pay three hundred thousand dollars for claims made upon
the policies.47 U.S. Life contended that since Independence di-
verted the escrow funds to Fieldcrest, the bankruptcy court should
place a constructive trust upon three hundred thousand dollars of
Fieldcrest's assets. The trustee in bankruptcy filed a motion to dis-
miss. The bankruptcy court denied the motion holding that it was
proper to impose a constructive trust upon assets in the estate,
notwithstanding the trustee's status as a bona fide purchaser under
section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code. 8
Fieldcrest is not dispositive in the instant controversy. The
Fieldcrest court reached the correct conclusion, but for the wrong
reason. The Illinois court never addressed the dispositive issue of
when a constructive trust arises in Illinois. Had it done so, it would
have discovered that a constructive trust arises at the time of the
wrongful act.49 In Fieldcrest, the wrongful act transpired prior to
the filing of the petition for bankruptcy reorganization. Therefore,
applying Illinois state law, section 541 operated to remove the
property from the estate, enabling the beneficiary of the construc-
tive trust to defeat the trustee in bankruptcy.
It is clear, at least to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, that
"[w]here state law impresses property that a debtor holds with a
constructive trust in favor of another, and the trust attaches prior
to the petition date, the trust beneficiary normally may recover its
equitable interest in the property through bankruptcy court pro-
ceedings." 50 Accordingly, the decision in Fieldcrest was correct.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, made it equally clear
that "section 541(d) overcomes the trustee's- section 544 powers
only where state law confers equitable title on a third party effec-
tive prior to the commencement of the bankruptcy case.""1
Under Florida law, a constructive trust arises when a court de-
clares one to exist, and not prior to such a declaration. Therefore,
the property over which City National Bank sought to impose a
constructive trust will remain property of the estate. Since the
47. Id. at 679.
48. Id.
49. Hagerty v. General Motors Corp. (In re Quality Holstein Leasing), 14 Ill. App. 3d
33, 43, 302 N.E.2d 678, 686 (1973) (supplemental opinion).
50. Vineyard v. McKenzie, 752 F.2d 1009, 1014 (5th Cir. 1985)(emphasis added).
51. Id. at n.10 (emphasis added).
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bankruptcy court did not declare that a constructive trust existed
prior to General Coffee's filing a petition for reorganization, 2 and
the property remained property of the estate, 3 the strong arm
clause empowered the trustee to retain the assets against the bene-
ficiary of the constructive trust, City National Bank.54
52. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7.
53. For example, in In re Tinnell Traffic Services, a trustee sought to set aside a trans-
fer from the debtor to the defendant as preferential. 41 Bankr. 1018. The defendant alleged
the property had been fraudulently obtained from them, and therefore, the debtor merely
held the property as a constructive trustee for the benefit of the defendant. The court noted
that since a debtor can only transfer property that is property of the estate, resolution of
this issue is a threshold requirement in addressing the trustee's preferential transfer claim.
Applying Tennessee state law which, like Florida law, deems a constructive trust to arise
only when a court declares one to exist. The court reasoned:
[s]ince constructive trusts are judge-created equitable remedies, the trust does
not come into existence until imposed by a court of equity. (Citations omitted).
In this case, it is clear that a constructive trust did not exist at the time the
debtor transferred the funds to the defendant. Without a judicial decree impos-
ing a constructive trust on the property in question, this court must hold that
the property transferred from the debtor to the defendant was indeed property
of the debtor.
Id. at 1021. Accordingly, the court determined that the property remained property of the
debtor, and subject to the trustee's preferential transfer claim.
54. In addition to the Fieldcrest court's failure to address an essential issue, the case
can be invalidated on other grounds. Its holding seems to be in conflict with both Noyes v.
Phillips (In re Phillips), 21 Bankr. 565 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982), and Loup v. Great Plains
Western Ranch Co. (In re Great Plains Western Ranch Co.), 38 Bankr. 899 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1984), which Judge Britton expressly adopted in the General Coffee opinion. General
Coffee, 41 Bankr. at 784.
Great Plains held that a trustee in bankruptcy, due to his status as-a bona fide pur-
chaser under section 544(a)(3), defeated the beneficiary of a constructive trust, even though
the constructive trust arose prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 38 Bankr. at 906.
The court stated that even if section 541 removed the property from the estate, section
544(a)(3) brought it back in. Id.
In In re Phillips, the plaintiff sought to impose a constructive trust upon funds owed by
the debtor under a promissory note and mortgage deed. The plaintiff conceded that legal
title to the mortgage was in the debtor but insisted that the equitable interest to the mort-
gage was with the plaintiff. 21 Bankr. at 566-67.
The court held that the debtor's position as a bona fide purchaser defeated the plain-
tiff's claim as a beneficiary of a constructive trust. It stated:
Where a person acquires title to property under such circumstances that other-
wise he would hold it upon a constructive trust or subject to an equitable lien, he
does not so hold it if he gives value for the property without notice of such
circumstances. As a bona fide purchaser, . . . the trustee's interest in the prop-
erty for the benefit of the estate is prior to whatever interest the plaintiff may
have. (Citations omitted).
Id. at 568.
Without expressly referencing the case, Shawmut Boston International Banking Corpo-
ration (Shawmut), as intervenor, sought to extend the holding of In re Phillips. It took the
position that to the extent the controversy involved real property, General Coffee's interest
pursuant to the strong arm clause defeated those of City National Bank regardless of when
the constructive trust arose. Memorandum of Law In Support of Shawmut Boston Interna-
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V. THE APPEAL
City National Bank has filed a Notice of Appeal.5 5 Predict-
ably, its position in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida will be similar to its position in the bank-
ruptcy court. If this argument fails, as it did in the bankruptcy
court, City National Bank should consider an appeal to the Elev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Eleventh Circuit must apply
Florida law. 6 Under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030,
the Supreme Court of Florida has discretionary jurisdiction over
questions of law certified by a United States Court of Appeals that
are 1) determinative of the cause of action and 2) for which there
is no controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of Florida.5 7 City
National Bank should be able to satisfy the requirements of Rule
9.030 because there is no controlling precedent of the Supreme
Court of Florida on the issue of when a constructive trust arises,
and the issue is determinative of the instant controversy. Only one
Florida case, Palmland Villas I Condominium Association v. Tay-
lor,55 a decision of the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal, has
reached the issue of when a constructive trust arises.
If City National Bank convinces the Supreme Court of Florida
tional Banking Corporation's Motion For Judgment on Pleadings, at 8, General Coffee
Corp., 41 Bankr. 781. This contention is without merit. In In re Phillips, under the applica-
ble state law, a bona fide purchaser of real property defeated the beneficiary of a construc-
tive trust irrespective of when the constructive trust arose. 21 Bankr. at 568. Therefore, the
property remained property of the estate and subject to the strong arm clause powers. In
the instant case, however, if the court had determined that a constructive trust predated the
bankruptcy petition, the property would have been removed from the property of the estate,
and not subject to the trustee's strong arm clause powers.
55. The parties had originally stipulated to appeal the case directly to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1293(b) (1982). In In re General Coffee
Corp., however, the court determined that Congress had repealed § 1293(b), abolishing the
jurisdiction of the courts of appeals to hear direct appeals from the bankruptcy courts, No.
84-5737 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 1985). Although lacking jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the court
exercised its transfer authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 (1982), and transferred the appeal to
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Id.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
57. The applicable parts of Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030 provide:
(2) Discretionary Jurisdiction. The discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court may be sought to review: . . .
(C) questions of law certified by the Supreme Court of the
United States or a United States Court of Appeals that are determi-
native of the cause of action and for which there is no controlling
precedent of the Supreme Court of Florida.
FLA. R. App. P. 9.030(a)(2) (1985).
58. 390 So. 2d at 123. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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to certify the question, it has only crossed the first hurdle. It must
also convince the court to accept jurisdiction to rule upon the is-
sue. Since the court's jurisdiction is discretionary, City National
Bank cannot compel the court to address the certified question. To
persuade the Supreme Court of Florida to accept jurisdiction, City
National Bank can argue that a single case bars its right to recov-
ery, and that it is entitled to have the Supreme Court of Florida
decide whether the law stated in Palmland is a correct statement
of Florida law. Arguments against the court exercising its jurisdic-
tion are that the language in Palmland is clear and unambiguous,
and that a second court, the Fifth District Court of Appeal, cited
Palmland as controlling precedent.5
If City National Bank can point to a decision in conflict with
Palmland, it will enhance its chances of convincing the Supreme
Court of Florida to accept jurisdiction. It may try to argue that the
Florida Second District Court of Appeal decision in Blumin v. El-
lis" is in conflict with Palmland, but that argument should fail. In
Blumin, the court considered the question of when an equitable
lien arises. Equitable liens, however, are distinguishable from con-
structive trusts, and more closely resemble resulting trusts since
they arise out of thwarted intentions. In Blumin, the court im-
posed an equitable lien by virtue of an intention demonstrated in a
written contract."1 The court held, "[a]lthough we have found no
reported decisions in this state on this question, nor any from our
sister state courts that are squarely on point, we hold that equita-
ble liens arise at the time of the transaction from which they
spring. "62 Thus, equitable liens, created pursuant to the intentions
of the parties, arise at the time of the agreement, not at the time
the court declares that they exist.
If equitable liens were analogous to constructive trusts, one
might argue that Blumin represents a contradictory decision to
Palmland. Blumin, however, is clearly distinguishable from Palm-
land. Blumin deals with a lien chargeable to a written document
expressing the intentions of the parties. A constructive trust, how-
ever, is a complete fiction; a remedy designed to do equity without
regard to the intentions of the parties." Accordingly, the creation
of a constructive trust must await the decision of an equity court
59. See supra note 22.
60. 186 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966).
61. Id. at 294.
62. Id. at 295.
63. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
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while the equitable lien arises at the time of the transaction,
merely awaiting a court decision for its perfection. Thus, it appears
that the various districts in Florida are not in conflict on this issue.
VI. CITY NATIONAL BANK V. GENERAL COFFEE: A GooD DECISION?
After a cursory reading of General Coffee, one's initial inclina-
tion is to recognize that money was stolen from City National
Bank, and to feel the money should be returned. The equities in-
volved, however, are not so simplistic. While it is true that General
Coffee fraudently obtained the funds from City National Bank,
funds were also fraudulently obtained from several other creditors.
For example, false financial documents were used by General Cof-
fee's officers to obtain a loan from Shawmut International Bank.
By defending this action, General Coffee is protecting the rights of
all of its creditors,"" some of which deserve the funds as much or
more than City National Bank. Through various fraudulent mea-
sures, the debtor allegedly obtained in excess of fifty million dol-
lars from banks. All of the banks are now unsecured creditors seek-
ing to salvage a minute percentage of the money owed to them that
was forfeited. The cost of any award to City National Bank will be
borne directly by these creditors, not General Coffee, the
fraudfeasor. A United States Bankruptcy Court in Florida recog-
nized this situation and stated, "a consideration of the equities to
all parties concerned is involved; the court may not focus solely on
the equities from the standpoint of the person wronged."6 In Pro-
fessor Scott's words, "[T]o be liberal is not always to be just, par-
ticularly where someone other than the liberal minded person foots
the bill."66 There is no doubt in this author's mind that Judge
Britton, when faced with the facts and law before him in General
Coffee, correctly decided the matter. Although the ruling is unique,
the situation was envisioned by legal scholars before the case arose.
The American Law Institute, in its tentative draft number two of
the Restatement of Restitution, Second, recognized the situation
but conspicuously chose to avoid it:
In controversies over the distribution of a debtor's assets, a con-
structive trust or equitable lien is prior in right to the claims of
his general creditors. If the debtor has acquired property by
64. See supra note 28.
65. Schifter v. First Fidelity Services, Inc. (In re First Fidelity Fin. Serv., Inc.), 36
Bankr. 508, 511 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983).
66. See Scorr, supra note 11, at § 521.
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fraud, and the person defrauded can identify that property-or
its proceeds-as an asset of the debtor, the value of that asset
will be applied in satisfaction of the duty before it is used to
satisfy ordinary debts of the wrongdoer."
The above language seems to support the position asserted by
City National Bank. The comment, however, continues:
The general rule of precedence just stated is subject to a number
of qualifications. It is modified by certain provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code [11 U.S.C.] in favor of the bankruptcy trustee
as a representative of creditors. (See, for example, section
544(a)(3).) . . . It is not within the scope of this Restatement to
describe statutory provisions whereby restitutionary rights are
limited or extended in particular circumstances.6 8
The American Law Institute recognized the issue that is the
subject of the instant case, but chose not to address it, leaving the
decision instead to the courts.
VII. CONCLUSION
City National Bank v. General Coffee has already been desig-
nated as controlling in a subsequent Florida bankruptcy proceed-
ing, albeit in front of the General Coffee judge.6 9 Clearly, General
Coffee, if affirmed on appeal, will have drastic effects upon the
practice of bankruptcy law in Florida. Constructive trusts, utilized
in equity to rectify fraud, will no longer be appropriate tools in a
bankruptcy court. The result is justified because when a wrongdoer
files for bankruptcy, the case no longer affects just the fraudfeasor
and victim. It also affects other creditors competing for limited as-
sets of the debtor. Any generosity shown to a party seeking the
imposition of a constructive trust necessarily diminishes the estate
to be divided among the remaining creditors. Although it is easy to
sympathize with City National Bank, this is one of the many areas
in law in which it is impossible to please everyone.
ANDREW P. GOLD*
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF REsTtTuiON § 43 comment b (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1984).
68. Id. (emphasis added).
69. In re Guaranteed Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 44 Bankr. 1004 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984).
Additionally, counsel relied upon General Coffee in Series 1 v. J. Janis (In re J. Janis: A.L.
Orchards Ltd.), 45 Bankr. 295 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985), although the court determined the
point was moot.
* The author would like to thank Susan Korenvaes Robin for her editing contribution
in the publication of this note.
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